Introduction

For Male and Perez-Castilho (1997) the objective of the economy of the information is to study situations in which the Agents look for to surpass its ignorance on an excellent information, taking desired decisions to acquire new information or to prevent costs of its ignorance. When the information asymmetrically is distributed between the Agents these decisions involves the estruturao of contracts that they search to promote incentives to induce the revelation of private information. For Stigliz (2000) many problems of information exist gifts in the economy. It cites some: employers want to know the productivity of its employees, its strong points and weak, investing they want to know the return of some assets where they could invest, insurance company wants to know the probability of its insured if to cause an accident or to be sick. These are examples of problems of adverse election, where what it matters they are the characteristics of the item that they are done business.

Salient Stiglitz that, moreover the employers also want to know if its employees are if strengtheing in the work, the insurance company wants to know if its insured is if preventing against accidents, the creditors want to know the risks that its debtors are assuming. Paynet pursues this goal as well. These are examples of incentive problems or moral risk, that focam in the behavior of the Agents. Therefore, in a economic transaction always a disequilibrium between who exists is buying and who is vendendo. Specifically, in the credit market for example, the banker does not know to differentiate who intends to pay or to not taken loan it. In situations where the asymmetry problem does not find solution, transactions are not materialize causing damages the purchasers and salesmen, or banks and borrowers of loan. In a crisis scene, where the confidence between the parts is threatened, the businesses are suspended temporarily, until information of better quality becomes available separating to riskier projects and me the quality of more solid projects and therefore, with lesser risk.

Under the point of view of the information asymmetry, the current crisis of subprime will only be controlled when the confidence between the agents reverse speed-will be established, making with that the appetite for risk of the banks comes back to the normal levels. Always remembering that this will happen normally saw market and not through governmental induction, as this that the Brazilian government if considered in the last weeks. Bibliography: KIRMANI, Amna and RAO, Akshay. In the Pain, the Gain: The Critical Review of the Literature on Signalling Unobservable Product Quality. Journal of Marketing vol.64, 2000, P. 66-79. STADLER, Male Ins and CASTILHO, David Perez. An Introduction you the Economic of Information.